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Abstract  
A lack of accountability is often considered a root cause of conflict. Many post-conflict reconstruction efforts 
therefore aim to enhance accountability between authorities and the population through community-driven 
reconstruction (CDR) programmes. This article examines the details of the accountability mechanisms in the Tushiriki 
CDR programme in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Based on ethnographic research, we found little impact 
of formal programme accountability. Rather, accountability was shaped differently and had its own context-specific 
meaning. To make accountability more sustainable, stronger embeddedness in local institutions and more appropriate 
translations of abstract concepts into the local context are needed. 
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Introduction 
Post-war reconstruction interventions increasingly espouse a commitment to being bottom-up and 
contextual, looking beyond state institutions and providing space for local ownership (Hilhorst et 
al. 2010; Kyamusugulwa 2013). One manifestation of this trend is the expansion of community-
driven development programmes in areas of recovery after conflict. In these areas, such 
interventions are called community-driven reconstruction (CDR) programmes. CDR is promoted 
by the World Bank and other international agencies. One major proponent is the International 
Rescue Committee (IRC), which has implemented large UK-Aid-supported CDR programmes in 
contexts including post-conflict Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) (Fearon et al. 2009; Humphreys et al. 2012). Numerous other international non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) have developed participatory programmes for community-
based reconstruction that follow similar working methods, although not always under the label of 
CDR. 
Typically, these bottom-up reconstruction programmes combine ‘hardware’ reconstruction 
objectives such as the restoration of schools, roads and services with ‘software’ objectives of 
enhancing democratic values and the local-level accountability of authorities. As one of the policy 
papers about CDR states, this is important in post-conflict contexts, where levels of trust, 
accountability and social cohesion are relatively low (Cliffe, et al. 2003). A study on CDR likewise 
observes that these programmes are based on the idea that people’s involvement in decision-
making and accountability processes may lead to change from conflict to development by 
addressing root causes of conflict, such as corruption, a lack of accountability, the absence of trust 
between people and institutions, and weakly functioning institutions (Maynard and Jodi 2007).  
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However, some recent robust evaluations, based on large-scale randomised controlled trials, 
have brought out sobering messages about these software objectives. Studies in the DRC and Sierra 
Leone reported no significant differences between the ‘treatment’ areas (part of the CDR effort) 
and the non-treatment areas (Humphreys et al. 2012). Findings in Liberia showed that social 
cohesion can increase through post-conflict development aid, but the mechanisms behind this 
change remain largely unclear. Overall, the impact of community-driven development on social 
cohesion seems limited (Fearon et al. 2009). 
The lack of effectiveness established by these evaluations may be conclusive, but the question 
of how these findings can be explained remains. Previous work has pointed out that the 
effectiveness of CDR is influenced by many different dynamics, such as local power relations, 
labour availability or accountability mechanisms (Kyamusugulwa and Hilhorst 2015). This paper 
aims to contribute to answering the question by focusing on CDR policies’ claim that building 
social accountability mechanisms into CDR programmes will enhance the transition from conflict 
to development. We examine accountability practices in a CDR programme in eastern DRC. In 
presenting our findings, we focus on three mechanisms: general assemblies, the display of reports 
and civil society as a watchdog. We also analyse how accountability works in practice and how 
the prescribed mechanisms contribute to this. 
In addition to following these specific mechanisms, we also explore how accountability 
emerged in unplanned ways around the programme through the development of community social 
practices allowing people to hold authorities accountable for their actions. These practices of what 
may be called moral or everyday accountability (Hilhorst 2003, pp 125-146) are integrated into 
everyday life and concern all kinds of ways that people convince their leaders to live up what they 
consider their responsibilities. Relevant behaviours here range from pleading or flattery to coercion 
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or even violence. One of the questions raised in this article is how such everyday forms of 
accountability permeate the formal accountability mechanisms introduced by CDR.  
Our interest in the accountability mechanisms of CDR begins with the simple premise that, 
regardless of the development intentions inspiring these programmes and the resources devoted to 
them, their effect crucially depends on the mechanisms used to achieve their objectives. Thus, this 
study asked how the theme of accountability was translated into specific mechanisms during the 
project implementation, and how these mechanisms worked in practice.  
The article is part of an ‘aidnography’ (ethnography of aid) of the Tushiriki Programme of IRC 
by the first author in three chiefdoms of the DRC. His study concerned a PhD project with intensive 
fieldwork from 2008 to 2010. The second and third author supervised the study and joined the 
fieldwork for brief periods of time.  
The paper is structured as follows: We begin by highlighting the background of accountability 
in development aid, with a particular focus on the DRC. We then describe the setting of the 
Tushiriki Programme, as well as the methods used in this study. Next, we present and analyse three 
accountability mechanisms used in the programme. In the final section, we conclude the article 
and outline the main implications of the research. 
Background of accountability in development aid 
Enhancing accountability is a major objective of CDR. Rather than aiming for accountability 
through institutions such as elections, social accountability is sought in everyday relations between 
authorities and the population. Transparency is part of accountability and obliges powerholders to 
provide information and to explain their actions. Social accountability goes beyond transparency, 
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as it also refers to responsibilities. Authorities must take responsibility and can be held responsible. 
In an accountable situation, a constituency has the capacity of enforcement and may impose 
sanctions on powerholders who violate their public duties (Ackerman 2004). Increasingly, people 
are expected to be active participants rather than merely passive beneficiaries of aid, and 
accountability is a precondition for genuine participation (Rubenstein 2007). The promotion of 
social accountability in development programming is closely related to participatory development, 
but an important difference is that the focus on social accountability has a strong emphasis on 
bringing about changes in relations with local authorities, rather than being focused on the 
implementation of the project.  
The literature suggests three reasons why enhancing social accountability contributes to 
improving governance and deepening democracy (Malena et al. 2004). First, accountability 
provides a way of discouraging and penalising corruption by strengthening the demand side of 
governance (McLean et al. 2005). Second, accountability can be used as a goal in itself or as a 
means of improving project effectiveness, efficiency and economy (Cavill and Sohail 2007). Third, 
it is claimed that local government and other local institutions will become more effective and 
more responsive to citizens’ desires if popular participation and accountability are built into local 
governance (Blair 2000). 
Previous work on social accountability distinguishes between formal and informal 
accountability. Formal—or rational—accountability constitutes reporting mechanisms to make 
performance transparent and controllable. Informal—or moral—accountability is geared towards 
creating trust and commonality through everyday practice. CDR interventions aim to introduce 
more formal accountability into the interactions between the population participating in 
humanitarian or development agencies’ programmes and the local authorities. One way to achieve 
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this is through public meetings. Bringing information and findings into the public sphere and 
generating public debate around them are considered key elements for accountability. Another 
accountability mechanism involves enhancing countervailing powers by encouraging civil society 
to hold authorities answerable on public affairs: the watchdog role (Malena et al. 2004).  
The promotion of local accountability as part of a development programme may increase 
knowledge and transparency and create conditions fostering empowerment, efficiency, assurance 
and honesty (Rubenstein 2007). However, it also risks creating conflicts between local 
powerholders and the newly empowered, a waste of resources, turning attention away from other 
important issues, the enhancement of mistrust and difficulties managing multiple accountabilities 
(Rubenstein 2007). 
A brief history of accountability in the DRC 
The accountability context of the DRC is complex, given the prolonged conflict that affected the 
eastern part of the country especially from 1996 to 2003. Pockets of violence continue to exist, 
particularly in the Kivu Provinces. However, for large parts of the provinces, conflict is no longer 
an everyday reality, and there is room for programmes like Tushiriki to work towards Community-
driven reconstruction. 
To understand the complexity of society in the DRC today—and to be able to tailor 
interventions—one also needs to consider the pre-conflict period (i.e. the Mobutu era, 1965–1997). 
Mobutu came to power through a coup d’état. Under his regime of Zairianisation, people were 
encouraged to fend for themselves, along the adage of the imaginary Article 15 of the Congolese 
Constitution: Débrouillez-vous. Patronage, corruption, maladministration and fraud were 
institutionalised; soldiers were allowed to prey upon the population, the state bureaucracy was 
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encouraged to be unaccountable and the president saw little difference between the nation’s 
resources and his own personal wealth. The state apparatus was encouraged to be self-financing 
through the exploitation of its own people, without any sense of a social contract-like 
responsibility. It is in this context that the wars of 1996–1997 and 1998–2003 occurred (Reyntjens 
2007; Trefon 2011). In 1997 the Mobutu regime was overthrown by Laurent-Desiré Kabila, who 
was succeeded by his son in 2001. Congo’s first democratic elections took place only in 2006. 
Throughout the Kabila regime, from 1997-2008, the situation in eastern DRC could be described 
as no war and no peace: some areas were controlled by armed groups, whereas other areas were 
under government control. Territories would frequently shift between forces. The international 
community balanced between humanitarian and development interventions. The Tushiriki 
programme was a reconstruction programme that aimed to restore small-scale infrastructure and 
at the same time introduce practice of accountability in local development and governance. 
Setting, programme description and methods 
Setting and programme description 
This research was carried out in two of the three chiefdoms targeted by the Tushiriki Programme: 
Burhinyi and Luhwindja, located in Mwenga territory, South Kivu province, eastern DRC. Both 
chiefdoms were heavily affected by the conflict from 1996 to 2003, which made them obvious 
targets for CDR interventions. The third chiefdom, Kaziba, had started earlier with the programme 
and hence was past the stage that was interesting to observe for this research.  
Within the chiefdoms of Burhinyi and Luhwindja, the IRC’s programme targeted 44,173 people 
living in eight randomly selected communities. The total population of the chiefdoms was 103,066. 
Although the programme spoke of Tushiriki communities and villages, these were artificially 
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designated by the programme (by selecting a part of a real administrative unit), in such a way that 
a ‘Tushiriki community’ consisted of nearly 6,000 inhabitants, and a ‘Tushiriki village’ was 
inhabited by about 1,200 residents. Our research has focused on the level of villages, and the 
remainder to the article only deals with that level of the programme. 
The CDR programme was called Tushiriki, meaning ‘let us all be involved in it together’. It 
was implemented by the American-based IRC through its office in Bukavu in South Kivu. The 
IRC has been operating in South Kivu since 1996. The Tushiriki Programme is one of two CDR 
programmes implemented by the IRC from 2008 to 2010. The other programme was the larger 
and longer lasting programme of Tuungane (Humphreys et al. 2012). Tushiriki was funded by the 
Dutch NGO Stichting Vluchteling (SV). 
The Tushiriki programme aimed to strengthen the capacity of civil society by increasing the 
understanding of good governance principles and practices and to promote advocacy efforts 
towards policymakers on behalf of communities. To achieve these aims, the programme focused 
on both civil society and community development. For community development, village 
development committees (VDCs) were set up to design and plan the ‘hardware’ of the 
reconstruction projects, such as classrooms, schoolmasters’ offices and local roads. On the 
‘software’ side, to familiarise beneficiaries with accountability, they were involved in committee 
elections; project identification, management and execution; training and regular general reporting 
assemblies (GRA) (Kyamusugulwa et al. 2014).  
The 10 members of the VDCs were elected during meetings. Equal participation of men and 
women was required. Each of the 34 target villages in the two studied chiefdoms was allocated a 
block grant of 3,000 USD. The villages were able to make decisions about the allocation of these 
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funds within the programme’s parameters. These parameters meant that they had to appoint a 
committee and were required to learn about governance principles through the implementation of 
the project. Projects could consist of the construction of a school, a road or a schoolmaster’s office. 
Working parallel to the VDCs, each Tushiriki village had its own civil society component: Local 
NGOs were selected to be in charge of supporting the activities of partnering NGOs and 
community-based organisations (CBO) through training on local governance and advocacy. In 
addition, the VDCs were checked by a control commission of two people: the Relais de Qualité, 
who acted as the eyes of the population. These were a man and a woman that were elected by the 
programme participants. They were supposed to denounce any mismanagement within the 
programme. For this they received training from the IRC or its NGO partners. 
Methods 
The data for the present study were drawn from in-depth qualitative fieldwork conducted by the 
first author from 2008 to 2010 during the Tushiriki Programme. This included 36 focus groups of 
residents and 50 individual interviews, as well as observations of general assemblies, training 
sessions, reconstruction activities and elections. The first author also conducted follow-up visits 
in the area in 2013 and 2015. The research participants, who were consulted in formal and informal 
settings, included committee members, elected team members and members of CBOs. Some 
people were interviewed several times. At the chiefdom level, interviews were also conducted with 
the local administrator based in Luhwindja. He also interviewed nine staff members of the 
Tushiriki Programme working in the study area. 
The programme elements outlined in this article were followed in 29 of the 49 target villages 
in the Tushiriki Programme. Villages were selected in such a way that multiple villages could be 
visited during one period of fieldwork. The villages were visited 5 to 7 times (usually for one day) 
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in the period before, during and after project implementation. After an initial analysis of the full 
set of data from the 29 villages, three cases have been selected to presentation in this paper.  The 
case studies reveal how these accountability mechanisms worked in practice as applied in the 
Tushiriki Programme. The cases represent similar processes found in the other areas, and the 
analysis partly draws on the data set of all villages.  
Results: three case studies 
A general reporting assembly  
Public meetings are a powerful component of accountability initiatives. Malena et al. (2004) have 
recognised that bringing information and findings into the public sphere and generating public 
debate around them is key for most accountability initiatives. Additionally, Cliffe et al. (2003) 
identify open meetings as a common way of encouraging accountability.  
The meetings in the Tushiriki programme were for example meant to elect committee members. 
The method of election was as follows. During the meeting, the Tushiriki staff would explain what 
was expected from committee members and ask who would like to be considered for the position. 
The people who raised their hands were asked to step outside and leave the meeting area. Then the 
staff would call out the names one by one and ask people to raise their hand if it was their favourite 
candidate. Even though the process was open and transparent, it was observed at several occasions 
how prospective members would discuss their candidacy beforehand with the chief or priest of the 
village. These village leaders were then seen to promote particular candidates, usually relatives or 
other people that were close to them. These dynamics surrounding the meeting were important in 
pre-selecting candidates and in the end committees consisted mainly of people who were not likely 
going to call their leaders to account. 
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One of the problems that was often encountered is that the meetings did not reach their quorum. 
In practice, this was often resolved by combining meetings with church gatherings, as happened 
in a public meeting in Karwera, a Tushiriki village in the Burhinyi chiefdom. Karwera is led by a 
chief and has one local church, the Cinquième Communauté des Eglises Libres de Pentecôte en 
Afrique (5th CELPA). The social standing of these two bodies strongly influences people’s 
behaviour. In 2008, the village had an estimated population of 953. This location is accessible by 
car. In the past, a number of self-initiated associations were set up to organise people into groups 
for carrying out agricultural work and bee-keeping. To join these groups, people had to pay 5 USD. 
As one resident noted, these associations did not have a long-term outlook and were not very 
serious regarding the services that they were supposed to provide to their members. As a result, 
the associations lost popularity, and membership numbers declined. 
Before the Tushiriki Programme came to the village in 2008, people had already obtained 
experience with the functioning of an international programme through the reconstruction of the 
Budaha primary school by the Associazione Volontari per il Servizio Internazionale (AVSI), a 
UNICEF-funded project. For that project, the residents of two villages contributed labour and local 
materials, carrying water, stones and sand from the river. One reason why AVSI selected this 
school was the area’s accessibility by road, making it easy for the implementing agency to visit 
the school. Residents therefore realised the importance of good infrastructure. Hence, when these 
people could select their own village project as part of the Tushiriki Programme, they decided to 
target the local road for reconstruction. This idea was initiated by local leaders, including the chief 
of the community, and then became popular among the residents. As one of the residents put it, ‘a 
road facilitates commercial activities, access to health services and schooling’. 
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After the first and second disbursements of Tushiriki funds to the Karwera VDC, a GRA was 
required to update the residents about the project. Only then would the additional funds be released. 
Several efforts had been made to organise a GRA, but the committee never managed to mobilise 
the required minimum of at least 40% of the residents for this special public meeting. Eventually, 
it was decided to hold the GRA at a Sunday church service. Committee members and church 
leaders were closely linked, and, therefore, the GRA was able to get a prominent place during the 
service. Tushiriki field staff also participated. In total, around 200 people attended, including 
children, but the 40% attendance requirement remained unmet. The male VDC president, a well-
educated development technician, informed the attendees that the Tushiriki had released two 
tranches of money summing to 1,315 USD of the total promised 3,000 USD. He further informed 
them that this money had been spent on travelling to the provincial capital to buy materials for the 
road rehabilitation, such as trowels, forks and wheelbarrows, and on wages for road workers, who 
were selected from among the Karwera residents.  
After the report was given, three questions were raised, all by men. The questions concerned 
the wages of the VDC members, about reconstructing the church building and about the next step 
at the CDC level for the project. The president quickly answered those questions, noting that the 
VDC members were not paid, because otherwise the realisation of upgrading the road could hardly 
be achieved, that nothing was planned for the church reconstruction and that there would be an 
election for the project at the CDC. His responses evoked no discussion, but the first author 
overheard some youth whispering that some costs were too high. After this special announcement, 
the pastor ended the service with a final prayer. 
This case epitomises how difficult it was to have a real discussion of the project’s progress in a 
public meeting. The population was not accustomed to this type of accountability in development 
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projects. The AVSI/UNICEF project, for instance, did not require any reporting to the population, 
and hence there was no such expectation on the basis of previous experiences. Interviewed people 
just appreciated the school building, with its solid walls of burnt bricks, roofs, floors, blackboards 
and six classrooms equipped with tables. In contrast, the Tushiriki Programme did have the 
obligation of a GRA, but it turned out to be difficult to interest people in attending these meetings. 
Usually, the first meetings were well-attended, but once it was clear that attendance did not provide 
concrete benefits, the attendant numbers dropped.  
When the quorum was not reached, it was smart to embed the meeting in an existing social 
institution with relatively high participation: the church service. However, this would further 
diminish the likelihood of an open discussion. People were not used to having open discussions in 
the church setting, particularly discussions about money matters. In addition, people were inclined 
to follow the opinion of the organising leaders—in this case the church leaders. Hence, the GRA 
mainly served as an obligatory hurdle without much critical reflection. 
Previous research has maintained that public meetings may have an effect in community driven 
programmes. The large CDR evaluation on Tuungane in Eastern DRC found, for instance, that 
people often used community meetings to voice their opinion (Humphreys 2008). While the 
mechanism of public meetings thus has its merits, local residents may have different ideas about 
this. In the case of the Tushiriki Programme, people quickly lost interest in meetings that failed to 
produce tangible results. This was resolved in the case described above by embedding the public 
meeting in already existing church services, even though this limited the discussion. The Tushiriki 
Programme required separate meetings with a strict quorum, but this was adapted locally. In this 
case, the public meeting as an accountability mechanism was adapted locally and transformed into 
a question-and-answer session held during a church service. The prescribed meeting thus took 
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place through the existing institution of the church. Prevailing social norms, however, hindered 
the open discussion of money matters. 
Displaying reports  
Apart from the GRAs, the Tushiriki protocol included a procedure for displaying reports providing 
updates about finances and project implementation. We observed this mechanism ourselves in 
three communities. The protocol states that the VDC should post a report about the project 
activities, including a financial report on the amounts received and spent (IRC and CARE 2009). 
For this case, we explain how the reports were received in three villages: Cibanda II and Mubone, 
located in the Luhwindja chiefdom, and Kanyimba village, located in the Burhinyi chiefdom. 
In each of these project villages, reports of the expenditures made were displayed, as required 
by the programme. However, participants of the research indicated that, despite the public display 
of the reports, nobody was willing to read them. People were not used to reading this kind of 
information, and many of them, especially women, were illiterate. For instance, a report was 
attached to the door of the Mubone 5th CELPA church one day. When asked about this report, a 
group of masons who were constructing a school near the church said that they had not read it. 
Further, they were unaware of any expenditure report. Interestingly, one of the masons noted that 
they already knew what was happening in the project because they could talk easily to the VDC 
members about it.  
Similarly, on March 25, 2009, when the first author visited Cibanda II village, a VDC report 
was displayed at a junction of two local roads. The report mentioned one decameter (an instrument 
used to measure the length of road that was completed per day), 40 trowels, 20 forks, 15 pickaxes, 
one piece of string and two machetes that had been purchased. Other materials were mentioned as 
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still needed, especially two wheelbarrows, seven trowels and three forks. These materials were for 
the construction of a road connecting Cibanda II village with the seat of the chiefdom. Strikingly, 
the report did not mention the exact amount of money received or spent for these materials. There 
were also some places in the report where the exact number of materials bought was crossed out, 
as though they were uncertain. Before people were able to read the report, it was taken away by 
the young people of the village. 
In Kanyimba village, the experience of displaying reports was similar to the stories from 
Mubone and Cibanda II. Here, a report providing details about the amount of money received by 
the VDC was pinned up on display. The male VDC secretary soon observed some children taking 
the report away, arguing that it was for a football match. In fact, youngsters in the village thought 
that every poster was a football advertisement, as this was the only activity that was ever 
advertised. 
The above examples show that the display of reports did not contribute much to accountability. 
The reports lacked detailed information, and people did not read them, either because they were 
not interested, because they were illiterate or because the announcements were quickly removed. 
However, an alternative form of accountability became clear in the words of one of the masons. 
He considered it enough to talk about the project with a VDC member (in the street or during 
neighbourly visits) because he trusted the VDC members. In general, it was found that community 
members involved in the Tushiriki preferred everyday conversations about the projects over formal 
reports, especially written reports. Although it has been argued that displaying council decisions, 
budgets and expenditures on public notice boards is a way of encouraging accountability, people’s 
perceptions of this may differ, especially in areas dominated by oral tradition (Cliffe et al. 2003). 
In the Tushiriki Programme, people could obtain information in more informal ways if they felt 
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they needed this. In the small communities where the Tushiriki was implemented, neighbours often 
sit together at the end of the afternoon and in these visits topics concerning the project could be 
brought up in a natural way. The mason in the case described above, made it clear that he trusted 
the account of VDC members. As VDC members were often close to the community leaders, their 
words were often respected.  
Throughout the fieldwork, the first author repeatedly noticed that participants in the projects - 
most of whom were illiterate - were satisfied with observing concrete realisations of the project 
had little expectations regarding reports, and certainly not regarding written reports. Several 
interviewees remarked that it was considered inappropriate to provide financial information in a 
written report. 
Community-based organisations as watchdogs 
An important aspect of building accountability in CDR is strengthening countervailing powers of 
CBOs and encouraging them to hold authorities responsible. The Tushiriki Programme had defined 
a role for community-based organisations, such as parent-teacher or farmer associations, to act as 
a watchdog to ensure that the VDC was accountable to residents about the selected project. This 
aspect is exemplified by the case of Ishogwe village, in Luhwindja chiefdom. In 2008, this village 
had 1,577 registered inhabitants. The village has one primary school, which was founded and 
continues to be managed by the 5th CELPA church. There is no secondary school and no a health 
centre in the village. The Protestant church and the chieftaincy are the most prominent institutions. 
At the time of this research, the village was headed by an interim chief. 
In 2008, when the Tushiriki Programme came to the village, a series of public meetings was 
held for VDC elections, needs identification, project selection and budget approval. Following this 
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process, Ishogwe residents selected the reconstruction of a bridge as their project, although the 
available grant of 3,000 USD was insufficient to complete this project. Residents told the first 
author that they selected the bridge because it would connect three villages even during flooding. 
The previously existing bridge had collapsed over five years earlier, and the inhabitants felt the 
project was crucial for them and for the area.  
Of the 70 CBOs in the chiefdom, 36 were selected for involvement in the Tushiriki programme. 
These included several CBOs of Ishogwe, notably the parent-teacher association and a women’s 
group. The CBOs were supposed to serve as watchdogs for the VDCs, which were managing the 
project funds on behalf of the population. The CBOs were trained by local NGOs that had been 
selected as partners of the Tushiriki programme. In Ishogwe, training was conducted by two 
NGOs, Centre d’Etudes de Documentation et d’Animation Civique (CEDAC), and Action pour le 
Développement en Milieux Ruraux (ADMR). The NGOs provided training for both the VDCs and 
the CBOs to familiarise them with the watchdog idea. Governance, bookkeeping and advocacy 
were among the topics developed by CEDAC and ADMR in the training session. However, neither 
of the NGOs had previous experience in exercising a watchdog role or in advocacy. CEDAC was 
well known for raising awareness regarding citizens’ duties, whereas ADMR was best known for 
planting trees.  
During the training, ADMR and CEDAC distributed basic stationery to every participating 
CBO for reporting their activities to the NGOs. One copy of the training module was given to the 
president of each VDC and CBO. Within the community setting, the CBOs were said to play the 
role of a check and balance on the VDC project management and to regularly monitor progress—
or the lack thereof—on the project. If the VDC proved to be less than accountable to its 
constituency, participants were told that they were entitled to ask questions of the VDC members. 
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Additionally, if they noticed no progress, the CBO members were told to question the VDC 
members about this.  
However, the aim of the training was not always reflected in what people reported learning. 
During follow-up interviews, we noted that most participants were not able to recall the message 
of the training in clear terms. One attendee, for example, remembered two things: (i) democracy 
and avoiding a dictatorship and (ii) working together to include disabled people. More generally, 
when recalling the training, interviewees who had participated in these training sessions reported 
that there were short training sessions with big groups of participants (up to 100) and that part of 
the training was in French. Some educated attendees spoke French, but, even for these people, the 
abstract concepts of the training were difficult to grasp. Concepts such as accountability, 
governance and advocacy were not translated into the local language or were translated in a limited 
way. Hence, in taking partners on board, Borren (2000) has emphasised the importance of defining 
beforehand how to engage with a partner, as well as the crucial role of empowerment and 
emancipatory learning. An important note is the simple observation that one cannot build 
capacities in others that he/she does not have him/herself (Eade 2007). Clearly, the failure in the 
technical assistance of CBOs by NGOs was one of the problems.  
The checks and balances of the CBOs’ watchdog role was generally complicated by the fact 
that people are often connected to each other in various ways in small communities. Members of 
the two committees and the control commission were residents of the same village and belonged 
to relatively close families or clans. For instance, the chief of the village was an adviser to the vice-
president of a CBO and also a member of the VDC. Raising criticism against the VDC then became 
difficult. When setting up interventions, complaints about preferential treatment were common 
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from people who were not targeted. Ultimately, however, complaints would simmer out because 
both beneficiaries and decision takers had an interest in maintaining their mutual relationships. 
In terms of accountability within the existing institutions, neither the chieftaincy nor the church 
had a history of transparency regarding the management of funds. However, on several occasions, 
we observed that both the chieftaincy and the church informed people about contributions to a 
project, either by shouting through a megaphone or during a church service. The Tushiriki 
Programme used the same means of informing people. What was new was the message of Tushiriki 
on the need for transparency about project funding, including disclosing details about expenditures 
and creating an arena for open discussion about the VDCs decisions. This was a sensitive issue, as 
the public discussion of financial matters goes against local culture. The accountability training 
provided did not overcome this. Additionally, not all participants had a good understanding of the 
training’s message because of language barriers, insufficient tailoring to fit the local context and a 
failure to provide adequate tools for people to take up their watchdog role. 
In short, the watchdog mechanism of accountability was hampered by a lack of capacity among 
the NGOs and CBOs involved, an inadequate translation of key concepts into the local vernacular 
and people’s everyday realities, and the complexity of relations between the actors involved at the 
community level. 
Conclusions 
Community-driven reconstruction programmes aiming to enhance accountability has become 
popular in conflict-affected areas. This paper followed one such programme in Eastern DRC. Even 
though an important claim of community-driven reconstruction is to address root causes of 
conflict, a first conclusion is that none of the mechanisms that were introduced for social 
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accountability were especially designed to address causes of the conflict, and nor were they 
evaluated in this light. The programme rested on the general assumption that governance principles 
such as accountability were connected to the root causes of conflict, such as a lack of trust and 
limited social cohesion. This raises the question to what extent community-driven reconstruction 
programmes address conflict or whether they use rhetoric of conflict in order to implement a set 
of actions that would probably be done in the same way in a peaceful area?  
[Please insert Figure 1 and Photo 1 here] 
This paper has analysed people’s views about accountability and its three mechanisms as 
applied in the Tushiriki Programme (Cfr. Figure 1). We have shown that the implementation of 
the mechanisms did not have a major impact on the accountability within the programme. The first 
mechanism presented in this paper was the GRA. Organising a public meeting during a church 
service was helpful in achieving a relatively high turnout. However, this was not a setting where 
people would usually have discussions. In addition, according to local culture, financial matters 
should not be spoken about publicly (Cfr. Photo 1). Hence, the mechanism of public meetings to 
increase financial accountability does not seem adequate. The second mechanism discussed was 
the prescribed public display of reports within communities. This had limited impact because of 
high levels of illiteracy and people not noticing the posted reports. People were clearly more 
accustomed to absorbing information through everyday conversations than from reading written 
text. Additionally, sensitive financial issues were barely mentioned in the reports. People were 
mostly interested in tangible results and much less in how they had come about. Finally, we 
discussed the watchdog role of CBOs. We showed that CBOs often either lacked the capacity for 
this or were too closely connected to the VDCs to act as a genuine counterweight. The latter issue 
seems difficult to overcome in small communities. However, attempts were made to address the 
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lack of capacity through training, but this had only limited results because of language barriers and 
the high number of participants. 
The formal social accountability mechanisms operated by blending them in practice with 
informal mechanisms. In the cases we presented, we found that people knew about the projects 
through everyday conversations and meetings were better attended when they were combined with 
church services. Does this mean that accountability came nonetheless about?  
Social accountability, as discussed in the background of this paper, concerns transparency of 
powerholders to explain their actions. Going beyond transparency alone, social accountability also 
implies that authorities can be held responsible for their actions. 
In the local adaptations of accountability that we observed in the Tushiriki villages, 
transparency did take shape, and community members were well informed about what happened 
with the projects in everyday conversations or meetings. The other side of holding authorities to 
account, did not come about. An important reason for this was that the dynamics around the 
selection of VDC members tended to be result in a VDC, as well as designated watchdogs, that 
were close to the village leaders (chiefs or pastors) and not likely to take a critical stance to the 
authorities. Holding meetings in the church would gather many people, but deterred the openness 
of the conversation, as church goers are used to listen rather than to speak during the services. 
Finally, it was found that common people in the villages tended to show respect to the VDC 
members and would take their word about the projects rather than probing deeper with questions 
on their governance. 
We can thus conclude that accountability came about in the Tushiriki programme, but was 
translated into informal and oral rather than formal and written mechanisms. While transparency 
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was therefore rather high, accountability was shaped in the process by local power realities, which 
are associated with churches and chieftaincy institutions.  
For the successful implementation of accountability mechanisms, it has been suggested that 
agencies must embed these mechanisms in the local context and take into account the values and 
norms associated with traditional forms of collective action (Pellini and Ayres 2007). Our findings 
bring out that such an adaptation to the local context enhances the working of accountability, yet 
restricts its possible impact as it becomes part of local power dynamics in the process.  
We argue that, to create a sustainable culture of accountability, there is indeed a need for a more 
appropriate translation of abstract concepts such as accountability into the local context. There is 
also a need to better understand the adjustments that take place when formal and informal forms 
of accountability intersect and intertwine in contexts where there is an imbalance of power.  
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